Όλες οι καταχωρήσεις
Εμφάνιση κατά:

16.10.2014 - Tierney v. Four H Land Co. Ltd. P’ship - Supreme Court of Nebraska

This case involved a parcel of real estate previously owned by Four H Land Company Limited Partnership (Four H). Four H twice applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate a sand and gravel pit on the property. James Tierney and Jeffrey Tierney objected to the applications. To resolve their dispute, the Tierneys, Four H, and Western Engineering Company (Western), the operator of the sand and gravel pit, entered into an agreement in 1998 in which the Tierneys agreed to waive their right to appeal the issuance of the CUP, and Four H and Western accepted various conditions regarding operation of the sand and gravel pit. In 2009, the Tierneys brought an action for specific performance, alleging that Four H and Western had not fulfilled the conditions of the agreement. The district court dismissed the Tierneys’ complaint for specific performance, concluding that Four H and Western had not met the requirements of the 1998 CUP and the agreement but that specific performance was not an appropriate remedy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that specific performance was an appropriate remedy for Four H’s and Western’s breach, and the district court should have ordered it. Remanded.

Λήψη αρχείου


16.10.2014 - Marshall v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia (majority) - Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

In 2010, the Archdiocese of Philadelphia filed an Application for Zoning/Use Registration Permit with the Philadelphia Department of Licenses and Inspections ("L&I") for conversion of the Nativity B.V.M. Elementary School into a 63-unit, one-bedroom apartment complex for low income senior citizens. The school was built in 1912 and operated by the Archdiocese in legal non-conformance with subsequently enacted zoning codes until 2008, when it had been closed due to declining enrollment and insufficient revenue. In 2009, the Archdiocese received funding under the Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly program of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") to convert the school to senior housing. L&I denied the Archdiocese's Application for Zoning/Use Registration Permit as not in compliance with several provisions of the Philadelphia Zoning Code. The Archdiocese appealed to the City of Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment ("ZBA") for use and dimensional variances. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the Commonwealth Court applied an improper standard in reversing the ZBA's grant of a variance. After careful review of the Commonwealth Court's opinion the Court concluded that the court erred by relying on an improper standard for unnecessary hardship and by substituting its judgment for that of the ZBA, thereby applying an incorrect standard of review.

Λήψη αρχείου


16.10.2014 - In the Matter of Inclusion into the City of Oxford - Supreme Court of Mississippi

Petitioners Catherine Babb, Beth King, and Robert King filed a Petition for Inclusion of certain real property into Oxford, Mississippi, pursuant to Mississippi Code Sections 21-1-45 to 47. The property was scheduled to become Baptist Memorial Hospital - North Mississippi, Inc. (BMH), a new, multi-million-dollar medical facility. Objectors Kenneth Ferrell and others filed an objection. The Chancery Court found the Petitioners met the statutory requirements for inclusion and approved the Petition. The Objectors appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Chancery Court.

Λήψη αρχείου


16.10.2014 - Knight v. Enbridge Pipelines, L.L.C. - U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

In 1952 an Illinois owner granted a pipeline operator an easement for two pipelines across the parcel. The first was built immediately; the second, if built, had to be within 10 feet of the first. The contract says that any pipeline must be “buried to such depth as will not interfere with such cultivation.” In 2012 the operator notified the owner that it planned to build a second pipeline. The owner filed a quiet-title suit, alleging that either the right to build a second line had expired or that another line would violate the farmability condition. The operator replied that 49 U.S.C. 60104(c), preempts enforcement of the farmability condition. The district court dismissed. A second pipeline has been built 50 feet from the first, using eminent domain to obtain the necessary rights, but the owner anticipates construction of a third pipeline. Vacating the judgment, the Seventh Circuit held that no construction is currently planned and the district court acted prematurely. Until details of a third pipeline’ are known, it is not possible to determine what effect it would have on agricultural use. Only if a third pipeline prevents using the land for agriculture would it be necessary (or prudent) to determine whether section 60104(c) establishes a federal right to destroy more of the land’s value than paid for in 1952. The court stated that it had no reason to think that Illinois would call the 1952 contract an option or apply the Rule Against Perpetuities.

Λήψη αρχείου


16.10.2014 - Phillips v. City of Whitefish - Supreme Court of Montana

In 2010, the City of Whitefish passed Resolution 10-46, which authorized the City to enter into an interlocal agreement with Flathead County concerning planning and zoning authority over a two-mile area surrounding the City. In 2011, voters in Whitehead passed a referendum repealing the Resolution. Plaintiffs, residents of the City and the County, filed the present lawsuit claiming that the citizens’ power of referendum and initiative did not extend to the Resolution. The district court agreed with Plaintiffs and granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs and the County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by not dismissing the suit as untimely based upon the doctrine of laches; and (2) did not err by determining that the Resolution was not subject to the right of voter initiative and referendum because the Resolution was an administrative act by the City.

Λήψη αρχείου


16.10.2014 - Pike Indus., Inc. v. City of Westbrook - Supreme Court of Maine

Pike Industries operated a quarry in the City of Westbrook. Smiling Hill Farm owned property and operated businesses near Pike’s quarry. After the City concluded that Pike did not have a grandfathered right to quarry and attempted to rezone the property and end Pike’s quarrying operations, Pike filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the City from enforcing its zoning ordinances. The City and Pike subsequently entered into a consent decree that allowed Pike to continue its quarrying operations subject and established a set of governing performance standards. Smiling Hill appealed. In Pike I, the Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions for the parties to formalize the performance standards. The parties then entered into a second consent decree. Smiling Hill appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the decree conformed to the requirements laid out in Pike I; and (2) the decree did not result in a forfeiture of the City’s enforcement power or an illegal contract zone.

Λήψη αρχείου


16.10.2014 - Tibbs v. Bd. of Comm’rs - Supreme Court of South Dakota

The Moody County Board of Adjustment granted a conditional use permit (CUP) to allow Mustang Pass, LLC (Mustang) to construct a concentrated animal feeding operation in Moody County. Several citizens (Citizens) petitioned the circuit court for a writ of certiorari to invalidate Mustang’s CUP, asserting (1) the Moody County Board acted in excess of its jurisdiction because Moody County failed, in 2003, to property enact its zoning ordinances creating the Moody County Board of Adjustment; and (2) the statutory scheme applicable to the appeal procedure from a board of adjustment decision violates the Equal Protection Clause. The circuit court denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statutory scheme comports with the Equal Protection Clause because a rational relationship exists between a legitimate legislative purpose and classifications the statute creates among citizens; and (2) the 2003 ordinances were validly enacted.

Λήψη αρχείου


16.10.2014 - Appeal of Town of Charlestown - Supreme Court of New Hampshire

The Town of Charlestown appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) dismissing its petition for reclassification of current use parcels owned by taxpayer TransCanada Hydro Northeast, Inc. The Town asserted that, "[b]ecause the three parcels are part of a development involving land use for the purpose of generating electricity, they have been improperly classified as open space land under" RSA chapter 79-A. As a result, the Town requested that the BTLA revoke the current use status of the three parcels and require the Town's assessing officials to reclassify the parcels. The Town further requested that the BTLA issue an order requiring the assessing officials to reassess taxes for tax years 2007 through 2012. TransCanada objected, arguing that the three parcels were not improperly classified as open space land. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the BTLA did not err in dismissing the Town's petition for reclassification on the ground that the Town could unilaterally reclassify the land. As the Town agreed at oral argument, the Court did not address whether the Town could apply the reclassification retrospectively.

Λήψη αρχείου


15.10.2014 - Reardon v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals - Supreme Court of Connecticut

Plaintiff property owner sent a letter to a zoning enforcement officer for the Town of Darien, asserting that permits obtained by her adjoining neighbor had been illegally issued. Plaintiff received no response to that letter. Plaintiff filed an application to appeal. The town zoning board of appeals dismissed Plaintiff’s application for lack of a timely appeal and lack of a “decision” from which an appeal could lie. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal from the decision of the board, concluding that substantial evidence supported the board’s determination that the town zoning enforcement officer did not make a decision that could be appealed. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the zoning enforcement officer rendered a decision that could be appealed either because (1) he actually made a determination regarding the merit of the violations alleged in her letter that he declined to communicate, or (2) because town zoning regulations obligated him to respond to or act upon the illegality alleged in Plaintiff's letter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the zoning enforcement officer’s action or inaction with respect to Plaintiff’s letter did not give rise to an independent “decision” from which an appeal to the board would lie.

Λήψη αρχείου


15.10.2014 - Town of Woodway v. Snohomish County (Majority and Dissent) - Supreme Court of Washington

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the "vested rights doctrine" applied to permit applications filed under plans and regulations that were later found to be noncompliant with the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA). In 2006, BSRE Point Wells LP asked Snohomish County to amend its comprehensive plan and zoning regulations to allow for a mixed use/urban center designation and redevelopment of the Point Wells site. BSRE wanted to redevelop the property by adding over 3,000 housing units and over 100,000 square feet of commercial and retail space. The petitioners, Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach Inc., opposed the project. They argued that the area lacked the infrastructure needed to support an urban center, namely sufficient roads and public transit. These nearby communities did not want to "bear the burden of providing urban services to the site." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the vested rights doctrine did apply to the permit applications filed in this case: local land use plans and development regulations enacted under the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW, are presumed valid upon adoption. Should a valid plan or regulation later be found to violate SEPA, the exclusive remedies provided by the GMA affect only future applications for development-not development rights that have already vested. In this case, BSRE Point Wells LP (BSRE) submitted complete applications for development permits before the local land use ordinances were found to be noncompliant with SEPA. BSRE's rights vested when it submitted its applications. A later finding of noncompliance did not affect BSRE's already vested rights.

Λήψη αρχείου


Σελίδα 7 από 11Πρώτη   Προηγούμενο   2  3  4  5  6  [7]  8  9  10  11  Επόμενο   Τελευταία   
Αναζήτηση
Λέξη στην περιγραφή:
Κατηγορία:
Διάδικοι:
Έτος:
Αρ. Πιν.:
Δικαστήριο:
Εκτέλεση αναζήτησης
Κατηγορίες
Ταυτότητα

To portal www.spatialplandev.gr δημιουργήθηκε στα μέσα του 2014 από την εταιρεία Spatial Planning & Development Ε.Π.Ε.

Επιστημονικός Υπεύθυνος της προσπάθειας αυτής έχει οριστεί ο κ. Κωνσταντίνος Τσάντζαλος, Δικηγόρος Αθηνών, πτυχιούχος της Νομικής Σχολής του Εθνικού και Καποδιστριακού Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών, κάτοχος μεταπτυχιακού τίτλου σπουδών (MSc) στο γνωστικό αντικείμενο Χωροταξίας – Πολεοδομίας – Περιφερειακής Ανάπτυξης του Τμήματος Μηχανικών Χωροταξίας, Πολεοδομίας & Περιφερειακής Ανάπτυξης της Πολυτεχνικής Σχολής του Πανεπιστημίου Θεσσαλίας και υπ. Διδάκτωρ του Τμήματος Πολιτικής Επιστήμης και Δημόσιας Διοίκησης της Σχολής Οικονομικών και Πολιτικών Σπουδών του Εθνικού και Καποδιστριακού Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών.

Facebook